Fake profiles that fuel social tensions in France
Dozens of highly active X/Twitter accounts activated in recent months are omnipresent in the platform’s suggested posts. Their strategy: to address divisive topics with the aim of accentuating social divisions in France, generating millions of views. However, there are several indications that these accounts are not authentic and are likely to be controlled by the same foreign entity.
During the summer of 2025, a small group of eight accounts stood out for their particularly intense activity and strong commitment to the September 10 movement. Detailed below, this network is believed to be run from Iranian territory, at least according to a government source. At the end of October 2025, however, no tangible evidence had been presented by the French authorities to support this claim. Nevertheless, this hypothesis would reinforce the already strong suspicions that these accounts originated abroad. In addition, several pro-Iranian posts were identified on most of them.
Case study: The “Iva Masson” network
In the weeks leading up to the social movement on September 10, a group of X accounts actively promoted the movement’s demands. Analysis of this network of eight accounts revealed that they were bots, controlled by a single entity, potentially foreign.
More than just opposition accounts, these profiles called for mass mobilization, even revolt against the government, notably with the hashtag GouvernementDeTromperie (Government of Deception) and by supporting the September 10 movement. To do so, they exploited numerous divisive, controversial, and conspiracy-theory topics. Fake news also regularly crept into these posts. These highly active accounts generated millions of views and regularly received thousands of engagements.
However, multiple indicators show that these accounts do not belong to real individuals. As a first example, the biographies of the accounts Ana Blan and Ava Lune are strictly identical.
In addition, all of these accounts present themselves as young women. Yet their images are stolen. A reverse image search reveals, for instance, that the account Iva Masson actually uses a picture, whose face has been modified using AI, taken from the Instagram account of an influencer.
Some of the replies posted are also very similar to what an AI would produce to generate automated responses: identification of the author of the initial message at the beginning of the text, and polished sentences with a tone and vocabulary that are rarely used naturally, especially on social media.
During the first days of activity of some of the accounts, several replies were posted in English to beg for followers in order to increase the visibility of their profiles.
These different accounts are part of the same network, consisting of 8 profiles, and are very likely managed by the same person or entity. They interact regularly with one another through numerous retweets, mutual mentions, or replies under tweets. It is also not uncommon to find the exact same tweets posted a few days apart on several of the accounts.
The “main account” of this network is that of Iva Masson. It was created in April 2025, but it is actually a second account: the previous one, which posted the same type of divisive content, was suspended when it had “more than 50,000 followers.”
It was during the creation of Iva Masson’s new account, in late April 2025, that the other “secondary” accounts also emerged. Common point: they were all created in February 2011, but were only activated at the same time and only began posting content between late April and early May 2025.
An error was also detected on the account of Ava Lune, who writes in some of her posts that she is Iva Masson, which suggests that these different accounts are very likely managed by one and the same person or entity.
It should be noted that on one of the accounts, tweets dating back to 2011 were found. These posts, written in English, appear to be original and therefore suggest that the account was hacked at some point.
While there is little doubt that these accounts are bots, several elements identified during the analysis also support the hypothesis of a foreign entity managing them. For instance, the tweets are often written in a tone that is overly formal for social media, suggesting they were likely generated using AI by someone who is not a native French speaker.
Moreover, certain errors tend to reinforce the hypothesis of a non-French origin, contrary to what these accounts claim. For example, confusing the date of Mother’s Day (notably with the date observed in English-speaking countries) or mistaking French Guiana for a city.
Finally, in addition to addressing crises in France, these accounts regularly post content concerning other countries. This includes criticizing support for Ukraine, expressing pro-Putin and pro-Russia sentiments while disparaging President Zelensky, as well as backing Iran against Israeli and American attacks.
At the time this analysis was published, in late August 2025, the exact origin of this network of artificial accounts could not be determined with certainty. A few days later, however, a government source told FranceInfo that these accounts were likely operated from Iran.
By late October 2025, these accounts remained active, continuing to opportunistically exploit various crises and controversial topics in an attempt to influence and fragment French society.
Plusieurs dizaines d'autres faux comptes partageant ces mêmes caractéristiques
Other similar accounts have already been identified, such as the account of “Michelle Roussel.” Registered on the platform in February 2011, this account was also reactivated in spring 2025 and exhibits many characteristics similar to the accounts in the previously detailed network. In this case, a glaring inconsistency in the posts becomes apparent when reviewing the account’s history. While it shared content that could reasonably be associated with left/ far-left politics during the summer, a sudden shift occurred a few weeks later, with the account posting content aligned with right/far-right positions. This reversal appears to have been effective: since early October 2025, the Michelle Roussel account has generated hundreds of thousands of views and tens of thousands of engagements.
Another example is the account of Elise Bardot, which also has a substantial following. In fact, several dozen suspicious accounts, all more or less interconnected, have been identified and appear to be managed by the same entity. With platform moderation on X/Twitter being virtually nonexistent, nothing seems to be done to curb this phenomenon, and these accounts continue to post extensively, deceiving thousands of people.
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